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Abstract
This essay addresses perceptions of time and 
temporality in legal rules and in legal knowledge 
under changing historical conditions. The first 
section treats the ongoing »temporal turn« in 
current debates (I). The second section discusses 
the notions of time in the 19th, 20th, and 21st
centuries (II): Since the late 19th century, the 
perception of time has undergone a fundamental 
change. Contrary to the Newtonian tradition, time 
is no longer perceived as a universal and objective 
entity. Instead, a process of subjectivization of time 
has emerged. As a consequence, concepts like the 
idea of »social time« or »multiple times« have been 
discussed in the humanities and social sciences.The 
following section deals with the relationship be-
tween law, legal knowledge, and temporality in 
general (III): Legal rules and legal knowledge can 
only be understood with reference to temporal 
modes as the distinction between past / present / 
future. In this regard, time constitutes a sense-
giving dimension of law. As a consequence, legal 
rules and legal knowledge serve as media of con-
temporary cultural practices of time and tempo-
rality. In this regard, the relationship between law 
and time is subject to historical change. Particular 
elements of temporality in the European legal 
tradition are dealt with in the next section (IV). 
While continuity and discontinuity as well as 
notions of eternity all appear as historical con-
stants, how history and its relation to law are 
grasped is subject to change. This seems all the 
more true when it comes to our understanding of 
future, whereas acceleration and its impact on legal 
normativity show elements of stronger historical 
continuity.
Keywords: time, future, temporality, risk, (dis-)
continuity
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Andreas Thier
Time, Law, and Legal History – Some Observations 
and Considerations*
I. From Space to Time
Apparently, recent research in legal history 
has turned to »space« – be it geographical or con-
strued – as a subject matter for more in-depth 
research. Particular interest in the »invention of 
legal space«,1 outlines about »legal spaces« (Rechts-
räume),2 a recently published anthology,3 and a 
newly established legal history volume series4
under the same title all point to a process of 
consolidation of a new paradigm taking place 
within legal history.5 This newly emerged legal 
historical interest in space is apparently the result 
of the adoption of earlier developments in the 
humanities and the emergence of studies in »spa-
tial humanities«:6 belonging to a series of several 
»turns«,7 what is referred to as the spatial turn
emerged toward the end of the 20th century8 and 
emphasized »space« as a reference point of dis-
courses and cultural practices, e. g., the mediality 
of spatial constructions as represented in maps.9
Within the context of legal history, this spatial 
turn was also part of the new debate concerning 
the perspectives, approaches, and methods of a 
global legal history.10 The growing interest in the 
phenomena of globalization has, however, also 
resulted in a renewed interest in time and tempo-
rality both in the humanities and social sciences.11
Collections of essays like »Timespace: Geographies 
of Temporality«12 and »Space, Time, Mediality 
(Raum, Zeit, Medialität)«13 indicate an interest in 
temporal phenomena as a dimension of spatial and 
global issues.14 Moreover, since around the 1970s, 
time in general has attracted a great deal of atten-
tion, which has already resulted in the identifica-
tion of a temporal turn,15 even though a healthy 
dose of skepticism towards the series of new 
»turns« might be appropriate.16 Sometimes these 
developments were also visible in legal history, for 
example, when Marie Theres Fögen, former editor 
of this journal, called for a perspective transition in 
2006 using the formula »From Space to Time« 
* This essay is part of a long-term proj-
ect; singular aspects have been pre-
sented in lectures and talks in Mün-
ster, Rome, Edinburgh, Saarbrücken, 
and Cologne. My sincere thanks go 
out to Thomas Duve for his kind and 
amicable support for this paper. I am 
very grateful for the opportunity to 
have discussed the subject »time and 
law« with Adam Kosto, Ada Kus-
kowski, and Claire Landis in the 
context of their presentation at the 
Annual Meeting of the Association 
for the Study of Law, Culture and the 
Humanities in April 2017. But I 
would also like to use this opportu-
nity to express my deep gratitude to 
James Thompson, not only for his 
tremendous efforts in editing this 
text, but also for his helpful and im-
portant suggestions beyond style and 
language. As a matter of fact, the 
responsibility for all mistakes and 
flaws is mine and mine alone.
1 Kuskowski (2014) with the sugges-
tive title »Inventing Legal Space«.
2 Ehlers (2016). For a magisterial sur-
vey, which connects former ap-
proaches on »Rechtskreise« (jurisdic-
tions) with new approaches and per-
spectives Dölemeyer (2010).
3 Meccarelli / Sastre (2016).
4 For the first volume of this series 
established at the Max Planck Insti-
tute for European Legal History, see 
Groth (2017).
5 For the interest of legal theory and 
legal sociology in »legal spaces«, see 
the outline in Manderson (2005). 
For a recent effort to conceptualize a 
topographically informed approach 
to legal normativity, see Müller-
Mall (2013).
6 For surveys on recent debates, see, for 
example, Bodenhamer et al. (2010); 
Id. et al. (2015); Gregor / Geddes 
(2014).
7 On the phenomena of »turns«, which 
initially began with the »linguistic 
turn«, see Bachmann-Medick (2016) 
passim, and as a short survey, see 
Bachmann-Medick (2010).
8 For an introduction, see Bachmann-
Medick (2016) 211–243, Ehlers
(2016) 41 ff. (with important refer-
ences to former traditions that had 
already emerged in the 19th century), 
Rau (2013); for more details, see 
Döring / Thielmann (2009); Csàky /
Leitgeb (2009); Schlögel (2003).
9 See, for example, Baumgärtner /
Stercken (eds.) (2012); Branch
(2014); Fieseler (2013); Lévy (ed.) 
(2015); Schöller (2015).
10 For a recent survey and description of 
this approach, see Duve (2016) and 
Id. (2017).
11 For the connection between space, 
globalization, and time as current 
topics of research, see the outline in 
Hassan (2010) 88–99, and for an 
analysis, see Lee (2012).
12 May / Thrift (2001).
13 Funken / Löw (2003).
14 For earlier approaches taking up 
geographies of time, see Glennie /
Thrift (1997).
15 As surveys: Geppert / Kössler
(2015a) 11, with further references; 
Hassan (2010) passim.
16 See the deconstruction of turns in 
terms of the sociology of knowledge 
in Bachmann-Medick (2016).
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(Vom Raum zur Zeit).17 Even though this call was 
not specifically directed towards legal historical 
analyses,18 the fact remains that research in legal 
history has always included subjects with temporal 
references. This underlying interest in time as the 
subject of research comes to the fore in studies, for 
example, on the importance and understanding of 
time in the context of Roman law,19 on the idea of 
duration and continuity with reference to the 
(in)famous argument of the »good old law«20
and customary law,21 on inter-temporal legisla-
tion,22 prescription,23 or – in a broader context – 
revolutions24 as one of the driving forces of legal 
evolution and development.
However, to the best of my knowledge, there 
has been no broader debate about temporal perspec-
tives in legal history research. It is certainly true that 
not all subjects of research need to undergo such 
a discussion concerning perspectives and possible 
topics. In the case of time, however, there has been 
a significant increase in the number of studies 
dealing with time and temporal phenomena in 
the course of the 20th and 21st centuries. And given 
this phenomenon, not to mention the already 
existing efforts within legal historical research to 
treat topics related to time and temporality, it can 
be helpful to discuss some aspects and perspectives 
of time, law, and legal knowledge. This is all the 
more true as the evolution of these efforts and 
approaches demonstrate that and to what extent 
time can be the subject of historical change and 
thus falls within the scope of disciplines utilizing 
historical approaches. As such, it is obviously also 
relevant for legal history.
In what follows, the aforementioned increase in 
temporal phenomena will be addressed in a first 
section. It shall be argued that this development 
was a consequence of changing understandings of 
time. It had its origin in the subjectification of 
time, thereby creating an interdependency be-
tween singular or collective subjects and temporal 
perceptions (below II). One expression – or more 
precisely, one medium for the collective perception 
of temporal phenomena – is represented by legal 
normativity and also legal knowledge. The reason 
for this lies in the entanglement of law, temporal 
elements, and societal action. Temporal elements 
such as continuity, discontinuity, or the distinction 
between present, past, and future are necessary 
conditions for giving sense and meaning to legal 
rules, their interpretation, and application. As a 
consequence, law’s dependency on different di-
mensions of time puts legal normativity and legal 
knowledge in a position where they act as media of 
contemporary understandings of time (at least to a 
certain extent) (see section III). Using several exam-
ples, the final section of this contribution will 
demonstrate that even though this relationship 
between temporality and legal normativity is more 
or less constant, at least in the European legal 
tradition, the perceptions and above all, the use 
of temporal elements changes in the course of 
historical evolution (see section IV). The essay 
closes with a short concluding remark (below V).
II. A (Very) Short History of Time in the 
20th Century
It seems to be one of the defining characteristics 
of 20th and 21st-century culture that it was – at least 
in the context of Western culture – deeply con-
cerned with the interpretation of time.25 While an 
overall history of time and its perception in this 
17 Fögen (2006) 13.
18 While the following two volumes 
of Rechtsgeschichte – Legal History
(10–11) presented several articles on 
time in general, the relationship be-
tween law, time, and history – inten-
tionally – went beyond the subjects 
covered, as Brupbacher (2007) 13, 
made clear.
19 Chevreau (2006); as a survey 
Schermaier (2011); groundbreak-
ing: Nörr (1969). On the notions of 
time in antique legal history in gen-
eral, see Jakab (2011).
20 Kern (1972); Liebrecht (2016).
21 Dilcher / Lück / Schulze / Wadle /
Weitzel / Wolter (1992), and Pilch
(2013), with reference to medieval 
continental Europe; Kuskowski
(2013) for a comparative approach to 
France and England, and Hudson
(2012), 853–855, for the complex re-
lationship of common law and cus-
toms in medieval England. For the 
early modern period see, for example, 
Garré (2005).
22 Thier (2004) on retroactive legisla-
tion in medieval canon law; concur-
ring, but providing important per-
spective augmentations, Siems
(2011). See Avenarius (1993) on 
Savigny’s doctrine of intertemporal 
private law.
23 Birr (2007).
24 Berman (1983), (2003).
25 For a more or less chronological out-
line, see Wendorff (1980) 455–663, 
and Zimmerli / Sandbothe (2007a) 
6–14. For a very coherent sketch, see 
Graf (2012) with a focus on debates 
in German-speaking historiography; 
for a broader base, see Esposito
(2017a) 11–24; for the debates in so-
ciology, see the literature surveys by 
Bergmann (1992), Nassehi (2008), 
Nowotny (1992).
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period has apparently yet to be written,26 it might 
nevertheless be possible to identify several tenden-
cies and stages of these discourses.
The introduction of »universal« or »standard 
time« in 188427 was one of several catalyzing 
factors involved in the rise of debates about con-
cepts of time,28 even though at that point a long 
tradition of theological, philosophical, and scien-
tific concepts of time and temporalities had already 
existed.29 Another important impulse for these 
debates resulted from Einstein and Minkowski’s 
connection of space and time in the concepts of 
relativity and spacetime developed at the begin-
ning of the 20th century.30 The starting point was 
the departure from the concept of absolute time31
and temporal dimensions that took place within 
the context of what has been called the »founda-
tional crisis of physics« (Grundlagenkrise der Phy-
sik),32 when Einstein made the argument »that we 
must not ascribe absolute meaning to the concept 
of simultaneity; instead, two events that are simul-
taneous when observed from some particular co-
ordinate system can no longer be considered si-
multaneous when observed from a system that is 
moving relative to that system«.33 With Minkow-
ski’s argument that only »a type of union« of space 
and time would »still stand independently on its 
own«,34 time had definitely lost the absolute status 
it enjoyed in Newton’s highly influential theory.35
If and to what extent the rise of quantum theory in 
the first third of the 20th century also played a 
significant role in the crisis of time as an absolute 
point of reference when it comes to the meaning of 
the physical world has been the subject of debate.36
Unfortunately, within the context of the present 
essay, only a brief discussion of this topic is possi-
ble. More relevant for the purposes of this paper is 
the importance of the first third of the 20th century 
as something like an incubation period for funda-
mentally new approaches to time in all branches 
of science and scholarship. A telling example of 
this phenomenon was J. M. E. McTaggart’s thesis 
of the »Unreality of Time«,37 with his argument 
about two different series of time – the famous 
distinction between an A-series (»the distinction 
of past, present and future«) and a B-Series (»the 
distinction between earlier and later«) – being 
comprehensible only by means of a C-series as an 
expression of their relational quality.38 McTaggart’s 
argument was one of the more radical – if not 
belonging to the most radical – expressions for the 
rising philosophical skepticism toward the concep-
tion of time as an absolute, universal reference of 
being. In other approaches, time became a dimen-
sion of human existence as in Heidegger’s funda-
mental concept of »Being and Time«, with its 
combination of »concern« (Sorge) and »temporal-
ity« (Zeitlichkeit)39 as modes of man’s existential 
being.40 The notion that time is rather an element 
of our understanding of the world instead of an 
abstract, objective entity beyond subjectivity was 
by no means essentially new. Kant had already 
26 Geppert / Kössler (2015a) 11–13 
with further references.
27 Blaise (2011) 69–85. Regarding the 
impact on later legislation in Ger-
many, see the short survey in 
Geppert / Kössler (2015a) 21.
28 Kern (1983) 11–15 and passim.
29 For an encyclopedic outline, see 
Wendorff (1980), Gloy (2008), and 
Birx (2009); for a more recent pub-
lication using an encyclopedic ap-
proach, see Demandt (2015), even 
though particular attention is paid to 
antiquity and early Christianity. See 
also the contributions in Bieber 
(2002), Ehlert (1997), and Klose 
(2004). For a very popular collection 
of essays aimed at a wider audience, 
see Safranski (2015).
30 Abhay / Petkov (2014); Maudlin
(2012). For a short, yet very instruc-
tive survey, see Corfield (2015) 
72–79 and passim.
31 For a very coherent survey on the 
tradition of this Newtonian idea and 
its consequences for the understand-
ing of history, see Lundmark (1993) 
62–67; in the broader context of a 
history of ideas about time, see 
Wendorff (1980) 235–238, and 
Gloy (2008) 126–129.
32 Survey: Müller / Schmieder (2016) 
512–518 with further references.
33 Einstein (1908) 897, here quoted 
from the translation in Einstein 
(1989) 145. For a similar interpreta-
tion of this statement, see Geppert /
Kössler (2015a) 11 f. For a short, yet 
helpful outline, see also Rindler 
(2001) 63–71 and passim.
34 Minkowski (1909) 1: [From now on] 
»sollen Raum für sich und Zeit für 
sich völlig zu Schatten herabsinken 
und nur noch eine Art Union der 
beiden soll Selbständigkeit bewah-
ren«, English in Minkowski (2012) 
39: »[…] space by itself and time by 
itself will recede completely to be-
come mere shadows and only a type 
of union of the two will still stand 
independently on its own«.
35 For a short, yet very instructive survey, 
see Corfield (2015) 72–75.
36 For a survey, see Zimmerli / Sand-
bothe (2007a) 9–10.
37 Mctaggart (1908).
38 For an excellent survey and analysis of 
Mctaggart’s argument, see Gerber 
(2006) 181–187, and Lundmark 
(1993) 68–72 (discussing also the 
consequences of this argument for 
historiography).
39 Heidegger (1977).
40 For surveys, see Dostal (2006), Gloy 
(2008) 179–193, and the contribu-
tions in Dreyfus / Wrathall (2005) 
191–334, all with further references.
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argued that neither time nor space could be under-
stood as »an empirical concept deduced from any 
experience«, but as »a subjective condition under 
which alone intuitions take place within us«.41 In 
fact, Kant’s ideas have been characterized as the 
»magna charta of modern time philosophy«,42
which would take a turn towards the subject’s 
perspective of time, particularly in Heidegger, even 
though the idea of time as a dimension of sub-
jective experience had been around in the philo-
sophical discourse since the late 19th century.43
From quite early on, this perspective on time as 
a dimension of the individual understanding of the 
world had equivalents in the idea that time figured 
not only as the subject of individual perception, but 
also served as a reference point for collective under-
standings and beliefs. Apparently, Emile Durk-
heim’s44 idea that time (as well as space) would 
be »objectively thought by all men of a particular 
civilization«, and that it is »the rhythm of social life 
that is the base of the category of time«,45 laid the 
groundwork for the concept of time as the product 
of a collective social practice – and in Durkheim’s 
case, above all, with regard to religious practice.46
In an important sense, Pitirim Sorokin and Robert 
Merton’s 1937 publication on »Social Time«47 con-
densed these developments into the description of 
social perceptions of time as »the change or move-
ment of social phenomena in terms of other social 
phenomena taken as points of reference«.48 Here, 
the concept of relativity was combined with the 
concept of time as the result of collective practice. 
For instance, in Maurice Halbwachs’49 well-known 
concept of collective memory as a temporal cul-
tural practice, this approach was applied to social 
perception and our memory of the past.
With Marc Bloch50 – who introduced »historical 
time« as the »very plasma in which events are 
immersed, and the field within they become in-
telligible«51 – time became an object of historio-
graphical research.52 This eventually led to the 
distinction of different levels of historical time, as 
Fernand Braudel53 did with his division of »histor-
ical time into geographical time, social time, and 
individual time«54 as well as his famous argument 
for the »longue durée« as a guiding perspective of 
historical research.55 On the other hand, however, 
it could also form the starting point for the dis-
tinction between different kinds of time as used by 
different social groups, as suggested by Jacques Le 
Goff. In 1960 he discussed the conflict that erupted 
between »Merchant’s Time and Church’s Time in 
the Middle Ages«,56 which involved the efforts by 
merchants to introduce methods of chronometry 
and the ecclesiastical resistance to these efforts 
based on the ecclesiastical idea of linear time.
Even though this approach has been highly 
contested,57 it nevertheless gives us at least an idea 
of how the multiplicity of historical times could be 
understood in terms of a conflict between different 
social groups and their time regimes. The rising 
importance of time as a subject of historiographical 
reflection could, however, also result in the de-
scription of historiography as a »type of being in 
41 Kant (1781/1922) 30, 33.
42 Sandbothe (1998) 75: »Magna charta 
der modernen Zeitphilosophie«; for 
an outline of Kant’s concept of time, 
see Ibid., 75–82, and in greater detail 
Gloy (2008) 129–151.
43 Kern (1983) 36–57 (for the construc-
tion of the past); Schmied (1985) 26–
36 (for Bergson); Sandbothe (1998) 
82–124 (for the relation between 
Bergson, Husserl, and Heidegger).
44 Alexander / Smith (2005).
45 Durkheim (1912) 14: c’est le temps tel 
qu’il est objectivement pensé par tous les 
hommes d’une même civilisation. 628: 
c’est le rythme de la vie sociale qui est à la 
base de la catégorie de temps.
46 Burke (2004) 618–620.
47 For an outline and a historical assess-
ment, see Schmied (1985) 45–49.
48 Sorokin / Merton (1937/1990) 89 
(quoted from the reprint 1990).
49 Halbwachs (1947/1996), (1950). On 
Halbwachs and his concept, see the 
contributions in Péquignot (2007), 
and for a recent study, see Aucher 
(2013).
50 Schöttler (2006/2015). A short sur-
vey is provided in Burke (1990) 
15–31.
51 Cf. Bloch (1949) 4–5: »le temps 
historique« as »le plasma même où 
baignent les phénomènes et comme le 
lieu de leur intelligibilité«. English 
quotation in the text taken from 
Bloch (2012) 23.
52 Geppert / Kössler (2015a) 16 f.; see 
also Burke (2004) 618.
53 Surveys in Burke (1990) 32–64 and 
Raphael (2006a).
54 Braudel (1995) 21.
55 Braudel (1958). For Braudel’s con-
cept, see Lundmark (1993) 62 ff., for 
an analysis of Braudel and his coun-
terpart Gurvitch, see Maillard
(2011).
56 Le Goff (1982).
57 Dohrn-Van Rossum (1992) 21–23, 
215–232; for a case study (confirming 
Dohrn-van Rossum) on late medieval 
Zurich, see Sutter (2001).
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the time of the modern man«, where the »historian 
of the past« is obliged to »refer to his present«, as 
Philippe Ariès58 put it.59
The relativity and subjectivity of time – whether 
embedded in the individual’s existence or con-
nected to collective subjectivities like societies – 
paved the way for the idea of pluralities of time 
perceptions: Helga Nowotny argued that »pluritem-
poralism«60 would represent a defining feature of 
at least modern societies. Particularly influential, 
however, was the historiographical implementa-
tion of temporal pluralities in Reinhart Koselleck’s 
works.61 Already in his dissertation on »Critique 
and Crisis«,62 in his habilitation thesis about 
»Prussia between Reform and Revolution« (Preus-
sen zwischen Reform und Revolution),63 and in par-
ticular, in several influential essays,64 Koselleck 
called for, developed (to an extent), and also 
applied a concept of historical research that he 
referred to as a »theory of historical times«.65 More 
or less adopting Heidegger’s idea of the presence of 
temporality in each individual’s existence, its 
being, and feeling, Koselleck widened this perspec-
tive and applied it to whole social formations at 
different points in history. In doing so, Koselleck 
analyzed historical perceptions of temporal phe-
nomena like history, change, tradition, progress, or 
the notion of future. As guiding epistemic vectors 
for these phenomena, Koselleck coined the inter-
linked duality of »space of experience« (Erfahrungs-
raum) and »horizon of expectation« (Erwartungs-
horizont).66 These terms marked anthropological 
and thus trans-historical fundamental categories of 
perceiving past, present, and future, not to men-
tion their temporal transitions like change or pro-
gress. From this perspective, the perception of time 
and history would change, and Koselleck under-
stood this multiplicity of perceptions in terms of a 
multiplicity of historical temporalities, i. e., as a 
multiplicity of historical times: »Each according to 
the chosen thematic, historians recognize, depos-
ited in and about one another, different passages of 
time which reveal different tempos of change«.67
Koselleck often described these phenomena by 
applying spatial attributes such as the term »layers 
of time« (Zeitschichten); a conception that inten-
tionally points »like its geological model, towards 
several levels of time (Zeitebenen) of differing 
duration and differentiable origin, which are none-
theless present and effectual at the same time«.68
Against this background, Koselleck argued that the 
period between 1750 and 1850, indeed, repre-
sented something quite special within the course 
of European history. During this 100 year period, 
the perception of time, of history, and thus of 
society, as well as of political power and economy 
underwent a fundamental change. As a result, he 
termed this truly special period Sattelzeit (saddle 
period).69 Koselleck never presented a fully elabo-
rated theory of historical times, nor a fully elabo-
rated overarching sketch about their possible shape 
and emergence within the course of European 
history. This is almost certainly due to his deep 
level of commitment to the historiographic prac-
tice. Nevertheless, Koselleck’s concept, which was 
outlined here in an extremely reduced form, rep-
resents one of the most remarkable historiograph-
ical developments and adoptions of the notions of 
time and temporality as fundamentally embedded 
in our human understanding of the world. Given 
its deep rootedness in the analysis of historical 
semantics, it provided historical science (as well 
as legal history70) with a strong empirical basis. 
Moreover, in dealing with temporality in terms of a 
58 For more on Ariès, see Hutton 
(2004) passim, and, with special 
reference to Ariès’ concept of time 
and historiography, see Ibid., 14–17, 
165–183.
59 Ariès (1988) 249 ff.: »Der Historiker 
der Gegenwart […] muss […] sich auf 
eine referentielle Vergangenheit be-
ziehen«. History »[…] wird eine Form 
des Daseins in der Zeit des modernen 
Menschen«.
60 Nowotny (1992) 428 ff.
61 Dutt / Laube (2013); Olsen (2012); 
Müller / Schmieder (2016) 278–
337; Palonen (2004) 180–309.
62 Koselleck (1988) 127–186.
63 Koselleck (1975).
64 Several contributions have been 
translated into English, see 
Koselleck (1985/2004), Koselleck
(2002). See also the essays in 
Koselleck (2000).
65 For a more in-depth analysis: Fisch
(2013); Zammito(2004), and Olsen
(2012) 217–267.
66 Koselleck (1985a/2004a).
67 Koselleck (2000a) 295: »Je nach seiner 
Thematik erkennt der Historiker ver-
schiedene Zeitabläufe, die un- und un-
tereinander gelagert verschiedene Tempi 
des Wandels aufweisen.« Translation as 
provided in Zammito (2004) 125.
68 Koselleck (2000) 9 (Introduction): 
»[…] verweisen, wie ihr geologisches 
Vorbild, auf mehrere Zeitebenen ver-
schiedener Dauer und unterschiedlicher 
Herkunft, die dennoch gleichzeitig vor-
handen und wirksam sind.« Transla-
tion as provided in Zammito (2004) 
125.
69 On this term, see Müller /
Schmieder (2016) 281–284, and 
Olsen (2012) 171–172, both with 
further references.
70 To the best of my knowledge, an 
account of Koselleck’s importance for 
the legal historical perspective has yet 
to be written.
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historical and cultural phenomenon possessing a 
substantial social impact, Koselleck paved the way 
for an enhanced perspective on and understanding 
of time; a conception that took very seriously the 
idea that knowledge and the perception of the 
world were the result of »the social construction 
of reality«71 – an idea at the heart of the debate 
within the sociological discourse in the last third of 
the 20th century. In particular, it was telling that 
Thomas Luckmann, one of the most important 
actors in this debate, also presented several studies 
regarding the social perception of time.72
The turn of attention within the social sciences 
to the societal processing of temporality found a 
strong expression in Nobert Elias’ highly influen-
tial essay on time as part of his overall research on 
civilizational evolution.73 In Elias’ work, the still 
operative latent distinction between natural, cos-
mological time, on the one hand, and human, 
social time (produced via human actions), on the 
other, were negated. Elias put forward the idea that 
time was a necessary »symbol of a social institu-
tion«. Time made it possible to compare otherwise 
incomparable sequences of events with each other: 
»The apparent movement of the sun […] the 
movements of the hand from one point on a 
clockface to another, are examples of recurrent 
patterns that can be used as reference units and 
means for comparing segments of events in other 
sequences, the successive segments of events in 
other sequences cannot be related together directly. 
As regulative and cognitive symbols these units thus 
take on the meaning of time units.«74 In fact, with 
this approach the »two opposed theories of time«, 
»an ›objective‹ fact« versus »a merely ›subjective‹ 
notion rooted in human nature«,75 became in a 
certain sense meaningless. Natural phenomena 
figured as possible, sometimes crucial points of 
reference for collective social actions, which served 
as fundamental conditions for normative regimes 
such as clocks, calendars, working periods, or – to 
switch to a more jurisprudential context – statutory 
periods, default and its compensation, prescrip-
tion, and similar legal institutions. In Niklas Luh-
mann’s systems theory, the concept of time and 
temporality as an »aspect of the social construction 
of reality« experienced a new degree of abstraction. 
According to Luhmann, time was defined as »the 
interpretation of reality with regard to the differ-
ence between past and future«, and it became 
relevant only in social formations with »the ca-
pacity to mediate relations between past and future 
in a present«.76 In this regard, time was essential 
for every social system in terms of one of the three 
»meaning dimensions« (Sinndimensionen), as Luh-
mann put it. Social systems needed to work in the 
»temporal dimension« in order to bring »incipient 
irreversibilities and a self-relatedness that keeps 
things from becoming irreversible […] into the 
meaningfully self-referential organization of psy-
chic and social systems«.77 In this regard, time 
made it possible to create order and thus reduce 
complexity.
This concept of time and temporality as neces-
sary functional elements of differentiated societies 
as well as Reinhart Koselleck’s analytical grasp, 
with its focus on semantic empiricism, were also 
expressions for perceptions of temporal phenom-
ena as part of historical change. It was, therefore, 
no accident that – starting around the 1980s – 
changing notions of time in history, e. g., in the 
context of »politics of time«,78 with a focus on the 
»sense of time« (Zeitsinn),79 the »authority of 
time«,80 or on cultural practices of time,81 became 
a subject of historical research and continued to be 
a very active area of research. This corresponded to 
a significant increase of interest in interdisciplinary 
approaches within temporal studies, embodied 
71 Berger / Luckmann (1967).
72 See, for example, Luckmann (2007) 
165–192: »Time and Identity: Inter-
nal, Social and Historical Time« (Zeit 
und Identität: Innere, soziale und his-
torische Zeit).
73 On Elias’ theory of civilization and its 
impact in general, see the contribu-
tions in Treibel (2000).
74 Elias (1992) 11, 10 (emphasis added).
75 Elias (1992) 5.
76 Luhmann (1976) 134, 135, 137.
77 Luhmann (1995) 81.
78 Osborne (1995).
79 Rüsen (2003), in particular Rüsen 
(2003a), Rustemeyer (2003).
80 Brendecke / Fuchs / Koller (2007).
81 See, for example, the contributions in 
Ehlert (1997) for the period since 
the Middle Ages, and the articles in 
Czock / Rathmann-Lutz (2016) and 
in Humphrey / Ormrod (2001) for 
the Middle Ages. For a survey on the 
development of debates and dis-
courses about time and temporality 
in the Middle Ages, see Czock / 
Rathmann-Lutz (2016a) 11–16, in-
cluding a very coherent outline. For 
one of the most important recent 
studies on the »time history of the 
Reformation period«, see Sandl 
(2011).
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not only in several anthologies about temporal 
themes,82 but also in the establishment of the 
International Society for the Study of Time.83 In this 
regard, it can be said that a kind of prognosis 
Luhmann made proved true, namely that »time 
itself is historicized, and all temporal semantics 
must come to terms with this«.84
In these studies, the notion of the relativization 
of time – be it as part of history or as an element 
of societal processes – reached a new level. This 
occurred together with a growing sensibility for 
different kinds of time cultures outside of the 
Western tradition, particularly in Asia,85 and char-
acterized this multiplicity of time perceptions, each 
of which is dependent on its respective cultural 
environment, in terms of a cultural pluritemporal-
ism. As a consequence, time and temporality were 
sometimes perceived as fractures of a globalized, 
yet highly fragmented society and its multiple 
cultures.86 Publications and headlines like »break-
ing up time«87 signaled the increasingly wide-
spread perception that »time might go to pieces«, 
as it is expressed in the title of a book written by 
Aleida Assmann with the telling subtitle »Rise and 
Fall of the Time Regime of Modernity«.88 This 
kind of argument converged with perceptions of 
a vanishing differentiation between past, present, 
and future, where »the present has […] extended 
both into the future and into the past«. Behind this 
thought provoking thesis stood the argument that, 
with the »notions of precaution and responsibility, 
through the acknowledgment of the irreparable 
and the irreversible, and through the notions of 
heritage and debt«, with a »double indebtedness, 
toward the past and the future«, the present had 
become dominant.89 This notion of a »broad pre-
sent«90 corresponded to a widespread notion of the 
universal dominion of acceleration as a defining 
feature of modernity and in particular postmoder-
nity.91 Acceleration had already become, however, 
a subject of broader sociological as well as histor-
ical debate in the last third of the 20th century,92
and thus prompted the following initial statement 
from the review of several studies on the subject 
published in 2010: »Acceleration is in some ways 
old news«.93 Moreover, it is debatable whether this 
»accelerationism«94 even represents an appropriate 
diagnosis,95 or if it represents rather a phenom-
enon of cultural critique96 that usually occurs in 
situations and processes of technological and me-
dia transitions.97 Nevertheless, the fact remains 
that the notion of time compression, of »an 
›empty‹ dimension of time«,98 or more generally 
spoken, of the loss of time is apparently widespread 
in the current discourse and debate.
III. Law, Legal Knowledge, and Temporality
It might appear as if legal normativity is more 
or less immune against erosive tendencies of time: 
It is the defining feature of legal rules that they 
claim validity, and this claim obviously includes a 
strong notion of continuity. Moreover, the tem-
poral scope of their application is an integral 
part of legal rules, which usually apply to future 
action or, particularly in the case of statutory law, 
at a defined point in time. So, it seems that legal 
normativity is in general more or less neutral 
towards social or, in a broader sense, cultural 
processes of changing perceptions of time and 
temporality.
82 See, for example, Aschoff et al. 
(1983); Baert (2000); Goltschnigg 
(2011); Lamneck / Tinnefeld (2000); 
Sandbothe / Zimmerli (1994); see 
also Zimmerli / Sandbothe (2007).
83 Parker (2013).
84 Luhmann (1995) 90.
85 See, for example, Schmidtpott 
(2015) and Steineck (2017) on Japan.
86 See, for example, Mavrofides et al. 
(2014) with further references.
87 Lorenz / Bevernage (2013).
88 Cf. Assmann (2013): Ist die Zeit aus 
den Fugen? Aufstieg und Fall des 
Zeitregimes der Moderne.
89 Hartog (2015) 201.
90 Gumbrecht (2014).
91 Survey in Esposito (2017a) 18–24, 
and Geppert / Kössler (2015) 26–31, 
both with further references. For 
what is almost considered a classic 
text, see Rosa (2005), in English Rosa 
(2015), and Rosa (2010), (2013).
92 Koselleck (1976/2000), Id. (2000a).
93 Crang (2010) 404.
94 Cf. Geppert / Kössler (2015a) 29: 
»Akzelerationalismus«.
95 For vehement criticism from a socio-
logical point of view, see Wajcman 
(2008) 61–64 and passim.
96 In this general direction, see also 
Esposito (2017a) 24.
97 A similar approach can be found in 
Escudier (2011).
98 Giddens (1991) 16, also 48 with 
reference to the loss of tradition as 
a part of modern time perception.
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Upon closer inspection, however, the relation 
between law and time appears to be more ambig-
uous: At least with regards to the history of Europe, 
legal normativity presents itself as oscillating be-
tween continuity and discontinuity. In other 
words, it fluctuates between the »return of legal 
figures« (Wiederkehr der Rechtsfiguren)99 and the 
great importance of conceptual and regulatory 
traditions. On the one hand, examples of the latter 
include the law of obligations.100 On the other, 
examples for the obvious impact of contemporary 
interests, conflicts, and cultures occur in the case of 
feudal law and the manorial system or the prose-
cution of alleged magical practices and their actors.
This kind of ambiguity regarding continuity 
and change in legal normativity and knowledge 
suggests that their relation to time and temporality 
might be more complex. It is obvious that there are 
different possible approaches and perspectives to 
the relation between law and time. A more philo-
sophical approach101 would certainly pursue an-
other avenue compared to a more doctrinal anal-
ysis of time-related legal rules, for example, on 
prescription, statutory periods of limitation, or the 
retroactive validity of legislatory norms.102 A socio-
logical approach would focus on the societal func-
tion of law »to anticipate, at least on the level of 
expectations, a still unknown, genuinely uncertain 
future«, as Niklas Luhmann has put it.103 Never-
theless, it should be possible to sketch at least a few 
overarching aspects of this relationship: Law and 
our understanding of legal normativity are, as 
already indicated above, obviously intertwined 
with at least a basic conception or sense of different 
temporal modes that distinguish between past /
present / future, or the difference between continu-
ity and discontinuity, or, to provide one last exam-
ple, the notion of eternity as opposed to the idea of 
permanent change. The conceptions of, for in-
stance, fixed periods and statutory limitations as 
well as the idea of the forfeiture of rights and 
claims by certain kinds of action over a longer 
period are apparently based on different ideas of 
time being present in law. A certain kind of 
culmination of this presence of time in law is 
represented by the famous »legal second«,104
which even ostensibly points, at least on the sur-
face, to something like »legal time«.105 In each of 
these cases, time is apparently a necessary epistemic 
precondition for imbuing these rules with sense 
and meaning.106 In this regard, time can be de-
scribed as an essential element of providing sense 
to legal rules and the reasoning concerning these 
legal rules – in other words as a sense-giving dimen-
sion of law.107
The relationship between law and time is, how-
ever, (at least to an extent) subject to historical 
change. In this regard the relation between law and 
time is part of the general entanglements of law 
and legal knowledge with historically changing 
perceptions of society, economy, politics and poli-
cies, and even nature: The idea, for instance, that a 
group of human beings could be understood as a 
legal entity, which has rights and obligations (thus 
another legal status) other than those of the indi-
vidual human members of the group, has been 
traced back to different conceptions of nature, 
man, and more generally, being in both late antiq-
uity and medieval theology.108 Whereas the con-
cept of contractual obligations (entailing a binding 
force), to provide another example, can be traced 
back to medieval religious ideas about the binding 
force of promises, within the course of the En-
lightenment the idea of socialitas, the consent of 
two individuals, and thus the idea of individual 
law-creating power became dominant.109 As these 
examples demonstrate, law and legal knowledge 
adopt changing interpretations of the world. This 
is not to deny the capacities and qualities of legal 
normativity as a means of protection and organ-
ization. Rather, it simply acknowledges that law 
and legal knowledge are always connected to and 
99 Mayer-Maly (1971).
100 Zimmermann (1990).
101 As an example, see Husserl (1955) 
and Kirste (1998).
102 As an example, see Winkler (1995).
103 Luhmann (2004) 147.
104 Marotzke (1991) with further refer-
ences; from a legal historical perspec-
tive, see Wieacker (1962).
105 Lembcke (2009); see also Kirste 
(2002).
106 For a similar line of thought, yet not 
in the legal realm, see Rüsen (2003a) 
and Rustemeyer (2003).
107 The German counterpart of this ex-
pression is Sinndimension, which has 
been translated in Luhmann (2004) 
205 and passim as »dimension of 
meaning«.
108 Cf. Schneider (2016).
109 Cf. Thier (2007) N 14, 19 with fur-
ther references.
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the result of changing cultural practices, and in this 
regard they frequently reflect but also process and 
elaborate contemporary understandings of the 
world.110 Moreover, it has even been argued that 
law is actually just an observational perspective on 
the world.111
In this regard, legal normativity and legal 
knowledge can be described as a medium of chang-
ing perceptions and an understanding of the world 
as a whole. This also (and particularly) holds true 
with regard to time: The perception of time and 
different temporal states or dimensions (such as the 
past or acceleration) is obviously the subject of 
changing perceptions and understandings, as was 
demonstrated in the prior section. It can even be 
said that there are occasions when legal rules are 
part of contemporary cultural practices of time and 
temporality. Such instances include when legal rules 
establish regimes of time like calendar reforms or 
norms regarding working hours. It is also the case 
when law deals with history, for example, when 
establishing practices of collective memory and 
sometimes even collective oblivion that are en-
forced by law, like in cases of the damnatio memo-
riae.112 While quite a number of possible cases and 
situations along these lines could be mentioned, 
such discussions would exceed the scope of this 
contribution.
There is yet another aspect that, unfortunately, 
can only be briefly touched upon here: From a 
normative perspective, the lack of a uniform, 
universal concept of time results in the necessity 
of providing reasons for the use of specific tempo-
ral concepts when it comes to the establishment of 
legal rules with temporal reference.113 For in-
stance, the introduction or modification of limi-
tation periods for particular crimes like murder or 
genocide, or even the renunciation of such limi-
tation periods will nearly always result in the 
question of its justification. There might even be 
something like an individual right of justification 
for such changes to limitation periods114 that goes 
beyond the reference to the principle of democrati-
cally legitimized legislatory power. But, again, this 
is an issue that exceeds the scope of this essay.
Yet when it comes to legal historical research, an 
even more important point needs to be considered: 
Notions of temporality – in particular the distinc-
tion of past, present, and future – seem to repre-
sent cultural constants, at least in the context of the 
European history of (philosophical) conceptions of 
time. Nevertheless, their understanding as well as 
their relation to human action are subject to 
historical change. In other words, it could be said 
that there is a kind of temporal epistemé of legal 
normativity that is (potentially) historically mutable. 
The medieval jurist Bartolus of Sassoferrato ex-
pressed the epistemic necessity of time for law 
when he stated, »temporis intervallum requiritur in 
facto hominis« (an interval of time is required in the 
action of man) in order to give sense to legal rules 
(in Bartolus’ case, rules about hereditary succes-
sion).115 Law and legal knowledge adopt, process, 
and express the changes that occur with respect to 
concepts of temporality and time. As such, their 
dependence on temporality as a dimension of 
meaning, law, and legal knowledge will presum-
ably function as media of changing cultural no-
tions of time and temporality.
It is, however, a defining feature of a medium 
that it does not mirror or store the communicated 
content; instead, media create their own dynamics 
of content that are then mediated.116 While this 
applies to law, it is particularly evident in legal 
history, for it offers striking examples of differences 
between legal cultures based on, for instance, 
orality, like the early medieval tribal societies,117
and based on literality, like the medieval church.118
Another example would be the impact of the 
invention of the printing press on law and legal 
doctrine in the 15th century;119 moreover, the con-
sequences of digitalization for law and jurispru-
dence are obviously a subject of intense debate in 
the present day and age. So, if law is understood 
110 On this aspect and its general impor-
tance for legal historical perspectives, 
see Thier (2015) 271.
111 Haltern (2012) 93.
112 Scholz et al. (2014).
113 An excellent contribution on this as-
pect can be found in Asholt (2016) 
218–221 and passim.
114 On the »right to justification« in 
general, see Forst (2014).
115 Bartolus (1550), ad D. 30.91.1, 
fol. 25ra (Summarium), in greater 
detail in Ibid., n. 1, fol. 25rb.
116 For this argument, see, for example, 
Krämer (2015) 13–37 and passim 
with an elaboration of the messenger 
model.
117 Dilcher (2008).
118 Landau (2006).
119 Vesting (2013), Thier (2017a).
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as the media of time and temporality, then legal 
normativity is not neutral in its use of time. Retro-
activity, for example, is a temporal legal category 
that can be addressed in different ways by elabo-
rating rules of protection against retroactive action 
or by using retroactivity as a means of achieving 
greater efficiency when it comes to legal rulings.120
Rules concerning insurance, for instance, are ori-
ented toward potential damages, that is, a future 
not yet present, and thus to the notions of risk and 
danger. But this temporal aspect does not say any-
thing about the normative direction connected with 
managing this kind of future. That means that legal 
historical research about the relationship between 
law and temporality should at least be aware of the 
fact that law and legal knowledge are, regarding 
their processing (Verarbeitung) of time, anything 
but neutral towards contemporary conflicts, inter-
ests, political and social structures, economic ten-
sions, or cultural values.121
The arguments and perspectives discussed so far 
necessarily entail a very high level of abstraction. In 
what follows, I will try to address these perspectives 
in more specific terms.
IV. Temporal Elements in European Legal 
Cultures Since Late Antiquity
It seems as though temporality serves an espe-
cially important function as an epistemic element 
in law when it comes to the dimensions of con-
tinuity and duration (and their opposites: disconti-
nuity and change); the same also holds for the 
notion of eternity and its opponent, mutability 
(below A). History, as another kind of temporal 
dimension, also plays a special role in the context 
of legal knowledge: As in so many other contexts, 
(changing) narratives of history have been used to 
describe the identity of legal orders, whether estab-
lished by God, mankind, or nations. In terms of 
some sort of transcendental scheme of general 
order, history became, among other things, an 
important device for structuring legal normativity 
(below B). Even though the future as a temporal 
dimension was already present in medieval legal 
culture, only since the early modern period did it 
start to exert a significant impact on the evolution 
of legal normativity.To a certain extent overlapping 
with ideas about a general order of history, the 
future was conceived in terms of both chance and 
potential danger. As a result, law would eventually 
become one of the most important instruments 
for managing risk and thus for »colonis[ing] the 
future«122 (below C). A final temporal element of 
importance for legal evolution is the notion of 
acceleration, of compressed time, and thus of the 
necessity for urgent action. It seems that within 
the context of European legal culture, in particular 
this perception of temporal speed would serve as 
the justification for the reduction of procedural 
order and thus of legal complexity, which were 
initially created as safeguards against the abuse of 
power (below D).
This list is by no means comprehensive; its 
purpose is merely to stimulate thought and to 
point to further signs and uses of temporality in 
law and legal knowledge. Another caveat regarding 
this period of time needs to be addressed: The 
history of antiquity has intentionally been left out 
due to the author’s limited expertise regarding this 
historical period.
A. Continuity and Duration, Discontinuity
and Change
Continuity and duration, as general temporal 
phenomena, are probably very closely connected 
with the experience of trust, even though it can 
also lead to boredom: an emotional status that, as 
Martina Kessel has demonstrated with regards to 
the Enlightenment, is closely linked to the tempo-
ral circumscriptions of human identities.123 These 
aspects point to the ambivalence of continuity and 
duration, which – in the context of legal order – 
can be understood as guaranteeing a proven level 
of quality, stability, and, by means of permanent 
use, a very well-established practice, on the one 
hand, and as reasons for sclerotic stiffness, the in-
capacity for reform and reorganization, and dys-
functionality due to changes of context, on the 
other. In fact, this kind of ambivalence developed 
a strong presence in legal practice already in the 
medieval period. The idea of customary law124 as 
120 Siems (2011), Thier (2004).
121 A similar perspective can be found in 
Schermaier (2011), 241–243 and 
passim.
122 Cf. Giddens (1991) 111. On the his-
tory of the well-known term »coloni-
sation of the future«, see Zwierlein 
(2010) 262 with further references.
123 Kessel (2001) 80–81, 161–163, 
335–337, and passim.
124 See references above, note 20.
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established by long-term use of specific unwritten 
rules was apparently quite widespread. The refer-
ence to consuetudinibus antiquitus traditis et jure non 
scripto such as in the »Constitution of Peace« of 
Mainz 1235,125 or the confirmation by Emperor 
Otto III. in 992 to the Venetians ut nulla nova 
consuetudo eis imponatur, sed secundum antiquam 
consuetudinem et iussionem pacti patris nostri eis 
pacifice liceat vivere126 demonstrated this kind of 
use, which has been analyzed in Hermann Krause’s 
masterful contribution.127 This corresponded to 
the fact that the learnt law of the Middle Ages 
developed very elaborate doctrines of consuetudo. 
Moreover, the concepts of continuity and duration 
of law was translated into the notion of maturity 
and special quality of such kinds of law. This led to 
the notion of the good old law, which has become a 
well-known subject of legal historical debate since 
its introduction by Fritz Kern in 1919.128 Quite 
probably, Kern’s conception of medieval law as 
»timeless« and »immutable« was to a certain extent 
inspired by his detached or remote stance toward 
the idea of progress and thus change in social, 
economic, and in particular legal orders, which 
were present in the early 20th-century discours-
es.129 But apart from that, it seems as if the refer-
ence to the age of a given law or legal system to 
legitimate its validity was in fact frequently used. 
A vivid example of this is found in the Saxon 
Mirror, when its author, Eike, highlighted the fact 
that »I did not invent this law myself; it has been 
handed down to us by our benevolent ancestors«.130
Yet this kind of reference probably represented 
more than a mere inclination toward the concepts 
of duration and continuity in medieval legal cul-
ture. References to tradition, to proven legal rules, 
to well-established customary law often served – 
particularly in the rural context – as legitimations 
for the validity of newly negotiated obligations and 
entitlements, which, however, were embedded in 
the notion of old, existing legal traditions.131
In these contexts, the reference to a specific 
temporal dimension of legal normativity – its 
alleged age and duration – and thus to something 
seemingly beyond human intervention ultimately 
became the basis for the claim of the validity of 
legal rules. On the other hand, however, the 
validity of long-standing customs could become 
the subject of confirmation by a ruler, or even serve 
as the point of reference for substitution by a 
decree of a ruler. This was combined with the idea 
of the power of rulers to change existing rules in 
order to adapt them to the change of time.132
When Frederick II. of Hohenstaufen, for example, 
issued the Constitutions of Melfi in 1231, he 
emphasized his power to issue new rules if it 
became necessary per rerum mutationes et tempo-
rum,133 while Pope Gregory VII. claimed in his 
famous (though apparently written for more or 
less internal purposes) dictatus papae of 1075134 the 
papal power pro temporis necessitate novas leges 
condere.135 It appears as if above all these temporal 
descriptions of legislatory power in terms of the 
competence to create something new became the 
enduring, more definitive feature of legislation. 
In 1765, for example, Karl Ferdinand Hommel 
stressed the argument alia reipublicae forma, alii 
mores, alia tempora alias quoque leges postulant,136
and ultimately in 1830 Jeremy Bentham made the 
variability of legislatory rules their defining feature 
by arguing that they are» variable at all times, 
variable at the pleasure of the Legislature for the 
time being, – is every article in this and every other 
Code«.137 Here, the tension between the continu-
ity and discontinuity of legal rules was used as a 
frame of reference for the description of law-mak-
ing power.138
This temporal scheme also worked, however, in 
the other direction, that is, as a means to describe 
the limitations of all forms of human power, in 
general, and of the power of individuals or specific 
groups, in particular. In these contexts, the dura-
125 Weiland (1896/1963), Nr. 196, 
pp. 241–246, 241: Constitutio pacis, 
15th August 1235.
126 Weiland (1893/1963), Nr. 20, pp. 
45–46, 45: Praeceptum confirmationis 
Venetis datum, 19th July 992.
127 Krause (1958) 209–211 and passim.
128 Kern (1972).
129 Liebrecht (2016).
130 Cf. Eckhardt (1955) 41 with lines 
151–154: dit recht hebbe ek selve nicht 
irdacht, it hebbet van aldere an unsik 
gebracht, unsere guden vorevaren (taken 
from the rhyme preface); for the 
translation into English, see Dobozy 
(1999) 13; additions added.
131 teuscher (2013).
132 For a general treatment of these con-
cepts in the Middle Ages, see 
Klinkenberg (1969).
133 Constitutions of Melfi I.38.1, in: 
Stürner (1996) 192.
134 Thier (2008).
135 Caspar (1955) 203.
136 Hommel, Principis cura legis (1765) 
in Polley (1975) 26–27.
137 Bentham (1983) 44.
138 For more details on these statements, 
see Thier (2006), 256–259 with fur-
ther references.
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tion and continuity of law and legal order were 
frequently described as something off limits to 
rule-making activities. As we have already seen, 
early medieval kings were apparently bound by the 
dispositions of their predecessors via land grants, 
assuming these dispositions were in accordance 
with contemporary normative values.139 The emer-
gence of the idea of transpersonal political power 
points in a similar direction, which, as Carol 
Greenhouse very convincingly argued,140 included 
the idea of transpersonal continuity: The famous 
tension between the »king’s two bodies« – between 
the king as a human being and the king as an 
institutional entity141 – corresponded to the ten-
sion between the temporal dimensions, that is, the 
biologically limited lifespan of a rule and the 
temporal infinity of his rulership. In this regard, 
two opposing elements of temporality – i. e., eter-
nity and immutability, on the one hand, and 
mutability and temporariness, on the other – con-
verge: The idea of temporal infinity (semper /always), 
or to use another term eternity, in opposition to 
temporariness, on the one hand, was connected 
with the idea of immutability of certain kinds of 
law or legal rights, on the other. In the medieval 
context, this kind of merger typically occurred in 
the idea of divine and / or natural law, as it had 
already been laid out in ancient Roman law (Inst. 
1.2.11) with its description as divina quadam pro-
videntia constituta semper firma atque immutabilia, 
and it was adopted in the context of the ius 
commune, for example, by Gratian’s argument 
naturale ius […] nec variatur tempore, sed immutabile 
permanet (D. 5 pr.). These well-known statements, 
which could easily be augmented,142 point to a 
layer of legal normativity characterized by its 
temporal quality – immutability – as beyond hu-
man legal action. In other words, natural law of 
this kind represented, due to its immutability, 
something that was, therefore, beyond other legal 
norms and legal disposition. This quality will be 
referred to here as transcendence (a quality of rules 
or institutions lying beyond every human power, 
even though it is not necessarily religiously con-
notated).143 Legal orders seem to demand this kind 
of transcendence in order to create different levels 
of normative validity and thus distinctions of 
changeable and immutable rules. Since the late 
18th century, the Western legal tradition is well 
accustomed to this kind of structure as embodied 
in the concept of constitutional law, which is 
rooted in the idea of natural laws as well as leges 
fundamentales.144 It seems important to note that 
this kind of transcendent legal normativity was – 
inter alia – defined by its special kind of non-
temporality. Thus time, again, apparently served – 
and, if we take a look at modern constitutional 
eternity clausula as in the German Federal Consti-
tution,145 still serves today – as a necessary refer-
ence for describing certain dimensions of legal va-
lidity. If this hypothesis is correct, it also points to 
another area where dimensions of temporality are 
necessary elements for understanding law and legal 
change: It might be fruitful to take a closer look at 
the making and also (non-)application of law in 
the context of revolutionary turmoil. It seems to be a 
defining feature of the culture of political turmoil 
that it creates temporalities of its own, in particular 
notions of discontinuity, disruption, and restaura-
tion, but – at least in the early modern and modern 
periods – also expectations for another, better 
future.146 Harold Berman has even argued that 
the Western legal tradition was a result of a whole 
series of such revolutions.147 It might be fruitful to 
take a closer look at the legal temporality of such 
revolutionary turmoil and its use by revolution-
139 Dorn (1991).
140 Greenhouse (1996) 93.
141 Kantorowicz (1957/2016). See also 
Gierke (1922).
142 Weigand (1967).
143 On this concept of transcendence, see 
Vorländer (2013) with further 
references.
144 Mohnhaupt / Grimm (2002).
145 Cf. Basic Law for the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany in the revised version 
published in the Federal Law Gazette 
Part III, classification number 100-1, 
last amended by Article 1 of the Act of 
23 December 2014 (Federal Law 
Gazette I p. 2438), as translated by 
Christian Tomuschat and David P. 
Currie, translation revised by Chris-
tianTomuschat and Professor Donald 
P. Kommers in cooperation with the 
Language Service of the German 
Bundestag, online https://www.
gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/
englisch_gg.html#p0416, here Art. 79 
section 3: »Amendments to this Basic 
Law affecting the division of the 
Federation into Länder, their partic-
ipation on principle in the legislative 
process, or the principles laid down in 
Articles 1 and 20 shall be inadmissi-
ble«. On the problems of eternity in 
the German Federal Constitution, see 
Dreier (2009).
146 Becker (1999).
147 Berman (1983), (2003).
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aries, for example, in the context of actions of ex-
propriation.148
These remarks can, of course, only hint at a few 
potential subjects for further research. Moreover, 
they are highly fragmented and lack any kind of 
evolutionary perspective. But it is possible that 
above all in the contexts of duration and change 
as well as eternity and mutability that a kind of 
constant of legal normativity – at least in the 
context of Western traditions – comes to the fore. 
This is, however, not the case in another dimension 
of temporality, which will be discussed in what 
follows.
B. History: On Origins, Traditions, and the 
Final Ends
The notion of »history« – understood not as 
mere duration or the past in isolation, but as one or 
several processes in the past that are the subject of 
memory in the present and, therefore, are also the 
subject of interpretation and the attribution of 
meaningful entanglements – obviously is of im-
portance for law and legal knowledge. It would 
seem that there are several kinds of »law’s his-
tory«149 as well as their functions in legal cultures.
In its most basic form, history constitutes a 
bridge between past and present; as an epistemic 
category, it thus becomes possible to understand 
situations and specifically normative rules as the 
result of something that has happened in the past. 
Understood as a process of linear evolution, history 
is apparently a potential starting point for generat-
ing order within legal texts. Typical examples in-
clude the Collectio Dionysiana, created around 500 
in Rome,150 and the Collectio Hispana, compiled 
in the 7th century151– both of which are so-called 
chronological collections of canon law.152 Both 
collections included inter alia conciliar canons in a 
chronological order; in this regard, they employ a 
linear conception of history as a reference point 
for their efforts to create order in a large bundle of 
legal texts. Interestingly enough, both collections 
made one exception to the chronological order: 
They placed canons of the first council of Nicaea 
(325)153(more or less)154 at the beginning, and 
only after its texts did the other canons follow. 
The preface of the Dionysiana stated that the 
canons »of all councils, whether held before or 
after that one« (i. e., the council of Nicaea).155 The 
Hispana collection took the same approach and 
argued, »at the beginning of this volume we put 
the synod of Nicaea, because of the authority of the 
same great council. Then we placed … various 
Greek and Latin councils, whether they were held 
before or after, arranged in chronological or-
der …«.156 In these statements, two categories for 
ordering legal rules were used: The conception of 
history as a linear process provided the basic 
element of order. But this kind of order establish-
ing the authority of history was superseded by the 
ecclesiastical authority of the Nicaean council. In 
creating this kind of tension between the two kinds 
of authority, the importance of the Nicaean coun-
cil became particularly visible, while the reference 
to history and chronological order literally served 
as the background for this image.
A more differentiated, but apparently infre-
quent use of the history of legal texts can be 
observed in the efforts of French humanistic juris-
prudence: Here, the history of Roman legal texts 
was used as a scheme for the structuring or order-
ing of commentaries on these legal rules. Interest-
ingly enough, this kind of connection of history 
148 Thier (2013).
149 Cf. the title of Raban (2013), even 
though his publication deals with the 
impact of European 19th century ju-
risprudence and legal history on the 
legal culture in the United States.
150 For a survey: Kéry (1999) 9–12;
Firey (2008); Maassen (1870) 
422–440.
151 Kéry (1999) 61–67; Maassen (1870) 
667–716, 802–806,and recently 
Scherer (2016).
152 For more on these kinds of canon law 
collections, see Massen (1870) 8–797, 
referred to here as Sammlungen der 
historischen Ordnung (»collection of 
the historical order«). On the organ-
izational patterns of medieval canon 
law collections prior to the 12th cen-
tury as a survey, see Fransen (1973) 
13–14.
153 As a survey: Brennecke (1994).
154 In the Dionysiana (first collection of 
councils), the so-called »Apostolic 
Canons« were inserted at the top of 
the list. For a more detailed account, 
see Firey (2008).
155 Cf. the edition in Glorie (1972) 41: 
... deinde regulas Nicaenae Deinde re-
gulas Nicaenae synodi, et deinceps om-
nium conciliorum, sive quae ante eam, 
sive quae postmodum facta sunt; trans-
lation in Somerville / Brasington 
(1998) 48.
156 Cf. the edition in Martínez Díez /
Rodríguez (1982) 45: In principio 
autem huius uoluminis Nicenam syno-
dum constituimus propter auctoritatem 
eiusdem magni concilii. Deinceps diver-
sorum conciliorum graecorum ac latino-
rum, siue quae antea seu quae post-
modum facta sunt sub ordine... tempo-
rum. Translation in Somerville /
Brasington (1998) 56.
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and doctrinal analysis never really caught on, at 
least not in the ius commune tradition.157
Beyond this use of (allegedly) historical order, 
there are approaches where history refers to the 
idea of a certain path of development of past, pre-
sent, and even future evolutionary processes.158
A vivid example for this concept of history is the 
idea of salvation history, which has a definite 
starting point with the creation of the world and 
a definite end with the apocalypse and the coming 
of the divine reign.159 Concepts like this one were 
occasionally present in arguments about legal rules 
and institutions. They could appear in the context 
of the idea of the purgatory as a stage of human 
history shortly before its end,160 or with reference 
to the origins of law in the Fall and the early 
history of mankind as it occurs in the debate about 
the idea of individual property,161 or in the dis-
tinction between ius naturae and ius gentium.162
Other examples would be the creation of historical 
narratives regarding the status of the pope and its 
law within a changing world in order to argue for 
or against papal power.163
It is quite obvious that when the concepts of 
history change, particularly with the rise of the 
notion of mankind as the subject of history (in-
stead of God) in the course of the early modern 
period,164 their relation to law and to legal knowl-
edge change as well. The change from the Fall to 
the natural state of man, for example,165 which 
occurred in the 17th century, reflects this kind of 
transition. But in the course of further develop-
ment, by the end of the 18th century, history had, 
again, changed its subject matter and, as a conse-
quence, so too its function within legal thought: 
With the rise of national histories and thus the 
»nation« as the new subject of history in the age of 
the German Historical School, the evolving narra-
tives of national tradition were initially used to 
define legal normativity as a product of national 
identity, which was represented by national history. 
But apart from this function that attributed an 
identity to a particular national law, history 
seemed increasingly to lose its influence on law 
and legal doctrine. The perception of law as the 
result of legislation and defined by its internal 
system166 did not leave much room for history to 
make a specific impact. Moreover, with the rise of 
constitutions as media and devices of collective 
national self-description, overarching concepts of 
history lost their influence.167 In other words, law 
became (probably for the first time) autonomous 
in its relation to history.
Nevertheless, specific legal rules – not only in 
this context – and (to a certain extent) also legal 
knowledge began to work as agents for collective 
memory:168 It is no coincidence that (particularly) 
since the 19th century, more and more rules 
emerged that dealt with and legally created na-
tional heritages and would later on establish the 
protection of cultural property as part of the legal 
protection of collective memory.169 Moreover, col-
lective historical narratives or even foundational 
myths were presented particularly in the prologues 
of constitutions as part of their integrative efforts 
and their symbolic representation.170 Not alone in 
157 Thier (2014) 226–227 with further 
references.
158 Similar approach in Goetz (2008) 
208–242, and Czock / Rathmann-
Lutz (2016a) 16–21, as well as the 
contributions in Czock / Rathmann-
Lutz (2016) in general.
159 Survey in Schmolinsky (2013) 96–99 
with further references; see also Ertl 
(2006) 306–330. In greater detail, see 
Czock (2016) 116–120, Kleine
(2016) 143–147, both with further 
references.
160 Moreira (2010).
161 Thier (2016).
162 Thier (2015a).
163 Ertl (2006) 322–364.
164 Koselleck (1985b/2004b).
165 On this transition, seeThier (2016). It 
appears, however, that this transition 
took place in a less than uniform 
fashion; in this regard, there might be 
further differentiations present than 
identified in Thier (2016).
166 Schröder (2012) 193–277.
167 Similar Wieacker (1967) 348 with 
the observation of a »positivism of the 
national state« (nationalstaatlicher 
Positivismus). See also Seinecke
(2015) 53–55, from the perspective of 
declining legal pluralism.
168 As an outline for the impact of this 
perspective on present research in the 
humanities, see Sandl (2005), and as 
an introduction, see Erll (2017).
169 Hammer (1995) with regard to Ger-
many; Schipper / Frank (2013), for 
the protection of cultural property in 
public international law of war; 
Odendahl (2005), with a multi-level 
approach; see also Vrdoljak (2006) 
for the role of the museums. For a 
very coherent and fruitful study on 
the case of Norway, see Eriksen
(2014).
170 On these phenomena, seeVorländer
(2004) and Id. (2012) 31–37; see also 
the contributions in Melville /
Vorländer (2002), and Depenheuer 
(2009).
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this context, constitutions and other legal rules had 
also dealt with the perception of past injustices, 
their sanction, their memory, the task of coming to 
terms with the past, and establishing, at the same 
time, procedures of transitional justice.171
Another type of »history« applies primarily to 
legal knowledge: At least in the more complex 
jurisprudential discourses, references to the past 
and the history of legal reasoning frequently serve 
to describe their own position in stronger terms 
by means of distance or reference to a very well-
established tradition. A typical example for this use 
of history is the self-description of the humanist 
mos gallicus as an opponent to the allegedly scle-
rotic, old, and traditional mos italicus.172 On the 
other hand, historical accounts of, for example, 
natural law in the 18th century, such as Christian 
Thomasius’ Historia juris naturalis, with its elabo-
ration of different lineae historis juris naturalis,173
were – as part of the so-called historia literaria – also 
a means to claim the historically grounded stability 
of a specific doctrinal approach174 and thus indi-
cate a process of consolidation within a paradigm 
of legal knowledge. In these approaches, history is, 
again, used as a means of establishing not only 
collective identity, but also – by way of distinguish-
ing past and present stages of an alleged develop-
ment – a kind of validity of a given paradigm or 
perspective.
The question remains if and to what extent such 
narratives are based on the notion of progress. 
This is particularly interesting in light of the argu-
ment that progress is a concept defining collective 
temporal perceptions in the periods after 1750.175
This also leads to a question that will be raised, yet 
not discussed here: Is it possible that legal discourse 
will create a history of its own at some point during 
its development? In other words: To what extent 
does the »autonomy of law«176 result in something 
like an »autonomy of law’s history«?
C. Future: From the Day of Judgment to Risk?
That the argument about uncertainty and fu-
ture catastrophes did not emerge prior to the early 
modern period is well established. Underlying this 
thesis is the previously mentioned concept of 
salvation history,177 where everything is deter-
mined by divine will.178 Thus, only with the shift 
of responsibility for history from God to mankind 
does man perceive the future as a human concern 
and disposability. The emergence of »risk«,179 both 
in terms of chance and danger as well as the 
fundamental scientific change accompanying the 
rise of mathematics and techniques of probabil-
ity,180 led to the »colonisation of the future« 
mentioned above.181 The growing impact of tech-
nology on all areas of human life, however, would 
result in the collectivization of risk by the emerg-
ing welfare state and eventually in the emergence 
of the risk society.182
This narrative, however, has become the subject 
of critique.183 In fact, the perspective of the medi-
eval period has to an extent already been called into 
question. Indeed, everything from the practice of 
medieval wills and medieval foundations points to 
the overarching concept of determined future as 
embodied in the idea of purgatory and dooms-
day.184 On the other hand, it has already been 
demonstrated that in the early Middle Ages a broad 
171 For an introduction and survey, see 
McGregor (2012) with further 
references. For an excellent case study, 
beyond the problems of transitional 
justice, based on Swiss constitutional 
history, see Schürer (2009).
172 Survey in Lepsius (2016) with further 
references.
173 Thomasius (1719/1972), Praefatio, 
headline of section 1 (ibd., 2).
174 Thier (2011) 225.
175 Koselleck (1985a/2004a) 265–268. 
Skeptical of this argument Czock
(2016) 117–118, with further refer-
ences, pointing to the notion of pro-
gress already in medieval concepts of 
temporality.
176 Rückert (1988).
177 See above, at note 159.
178 See, for example, the impressive con-
tribution by Lindenau / Münkler 
(2012); heavily condensed but also 
very coherent Luhmann (1991) 
16–23. As a survey on this narrative, 
see Thier (2017) 848–849, with fur-
ther references, Zwierlein (2011) 
21–23.
179 On the historical semantic of the term 
»risk«, see Rammstedt (1992).
180 Bernstein (1996).
181 Above, note 122.
182 Ewald (1993); Beck (1986); Giddens
(1991) 109–143.
183 Zwierlein / Graf (2010) 14–16; 
Zwierlein (2011) 23–24, 365–366; 
see also Itzen / Müller (2016) 12–13.
184 Survey in Schmolinsky (2013) 96–98 
with further references.
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variety of possible perceptions of the future existed, 
which specifically included the possibility of a – 
though limited – protected human future.185
Moreover, it appears that the handling of natural 
disasters via rules of periculum and liability repre-
sented a consolidated tradition of Roman law and 
its medieval continuations.186 On the other hand, 
it seems as if the early modern practice of Policey
was deeply committed to the idea of a strong 
divine presence in history, which itself was per-
ceived as a kind of risk.187 However, if we look 
beyond these kinds of objections, we might notice 
that something more important is at stake in the 
present context: Dealing with the future under-
stood in terms of uncertainties and risks has appar-
ently been the subject of a more or less steady legal 
evolution; one that follows a pattern not only of 
the rising collectivization of risks but also of the 
emergence and rise of a type of statehood. The 
longer these states persisted, the more responsibil-
ity they took over for the potential dangers and, as 
a consequence, increasingly also for risk allocations 
in general. This path of development came to the 
fore with the establishment of governmental in-
surances initially against fire damage and, then, 
since the late 18th century for social security.188
Nevertheless, at this point a great share of the risk 
remained with the individual. A famous judge-
ment by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, 
Suffolk and Nantucket (1842), makes this espe-
cially clear: In allocating the risk of working 
accidents caused by a third party to the employee, 
the court made unmistakably clear that »resulting 
from considerations as well of justice as of policy 
[…] that he who engages in the employment of 
another for the performance of specified duties and 
services, for compensation, takes upon himself the 
natural and ordinary risks and perils incident to the 
performance of such services, and in legal pre-
sumption, the compensation is adjusted accord-
ingly.«189 This strictly individualistic perspective 
found its counterpart nearly 60 years later in a 
statement regarding speculative action in the fi-
nancial markets, which by this point had already 
developed into a fiercely debated economic prac-
tice.190 Yet Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. left no 
doubt that he and the Federal Supreme Court of 
the United States were not prepared to set limits to 
these individual risk actions: »Speculation […] by 
competent men is the self-adjustment of society 
to the probable. Its value is well known as a means 
of avoiding or mitigating catastrophes, equalizing 
prices, and providing for periods of want«.191
Individual economic freedom, as guaranteed by 
the law, translated into the freedom to bet on the 
future and was perceived here as a necessary part of 
social evolution.192
But in the course of further development, this 
kind of individualization of the future and its 
economic risk was increasingly limited in order 
to protect the investors’ interests and, more re-
cently, the finance system.193 While this kind of 
governmental intervention left the legal guarantee 
of acting with regard to the future intact, in the 
field of technology – and due to their fundamental 
risk for the whole of mankind – the longer the state 
existed, the greater its power to make decisions 
about risk on its own and with binding force.194
In general, in its function and relationship to 
law and legal knowledge, it appears as if the future 
as a temporal dimension might have undergone a 
greater degree of change than other elements of 
time perception. Apart from the fact that the 
»colonisation of the future« is seemingly perceived 
as an endeavor not solely residing with the indi-
vidual and without any kind of regulation, there 
might be another reason for this: Technological 
evolution has actually resulted in the fact that 
185 Butz (2016), Czock (2016), Kleine
(2016), Schlieben (2016). In a similar 
direction, see Schmolinsy (2013) 
100–101 and passim.
186 Etier (2006).
187 Summarizing Thier (2017) 852–854. 
In more detail and including the de-
bate about »security«, see Härter 
(2010), Simon (2004) 135–141.
188 Zwierlein (2011) 262–314.
189 Nicholas Farwell vs. The Boston and 
Worcester Rail Road Corporation 45 
Mass. 49 (1842) 57, 59. On this case, 
see Levy (2012) 7–20, Thier (2017) 
859–860.
190 Engel (2013), see also Stäheli 
(2007).
191 Federal Supreme Court of the United 
States, Board of Trade v. Christie 
Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236 
(1905) 247.
192 Thier (2017) 857 with further refer-
ences.
193 For a survey from a Swiss perspective 
with multiple references, see 
Contratto (2013).
194 Seminal contribution by Di Fabio 
(1994) from a doctrinal rather than a 
historical perspective.
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future development could very well prove itself 
extremely dangerous for all of mankind, for in-
stance, in the case of nuclear power, pharmaceu-
tical products, or genetic manipulation. And such 
dangers could manifest themselves very quickly. 
In other words, it might be that technological 
progress has in a certain sense resulted in a con-
traction of the future, and law and legal knowledge 
process this contraction via the development of 
rules like the precautionary principle and its en-
hancement.
D. Acceleration
It is certainly true that acceleration is nowadays 
one of the dominant modes of collective experi-
ence.195 Globalization and, to an even greater 
extent, the spread of digital communication have 
in fact led to a highly accelerated stream of news, 
impressions, and thus challenges. While it seems 
that the legal cultures have from very early on 
included the notion of time compression and 
urgency, it is only since around the middle of the 
19th century that this temporal dimension devel-
oped and exerted a more profound impact on legal 
evolution. This argument stems from the obser-
vation about the history of the formula periculum 
est in mora: the expression dilatio periculum allatura 
est (delay will occasion some danger) in Roman 
law,196 which contains an exception to the obliga-
tion to notify the public about new building 
projects when watercourses and sewers were at 
issue. However, this more or less peripheral rule 
underwent at the beginning of the early modern 
period a remarkable extension. Jason de Mayno 
summarized the general opinion that the Roman 
law text would create »the rule, which is frequently 
referred to nowadays, that we, when danger is in 
delay, deviate from the rules of the general law 
(regulis iuris communis) and that the arrangement of 
laws, even from prohibitions, is loosened«.197 Nei-
ther the evolution nor the background of this 
concept is particularly clear. Nevertheless, it was 
apparently quite successful, and in 1714 a disserta-
tion tracing the periculum est in mora throughout 
the entirety of the legal order was published.198
This strongly suggests that the perception of sit-
uations involving compressed time were fairly 
widespread. The next, and apparently final, step 
was taken in the 19th century with the introduction 
of the law of emergency decrees in constitutions 
like the Prussian Constitutional Charter 1848199
and later in other modern constitutions or con-
stitutional practices such as emergency law in the 
case of the Swiss federal constitution of 1874/
1999.200
Of course, this short survey can offer little more 
than a few general impressions. Nevertheless, it 
might have become clear that the notion of ur-
gency represents a subject familiar to the Western 
legal tradition, and in this regard it is even older 
than the present notions of acceleration. The rea-
son for this phenomenon could be the temporal 
function of legal normativity, which clearly has to 
ensure some kind of continuity in order to gen-
erate expectations of trust and safety.201 Given this 
function, every notion of urgency in law presents a 
problem, for, as Jason de Mayno made clear, the 
validity of law is at stake. On the other hand, it is 
very likely that a more or less elaborated legal 
culture cannot afford to neglect the problem of 
time compression, for otherwise a very real danger 
exists in urgent situations that legal norms would 
not be followed. This strongly suggests that legal 
orders are always preoccupied with the question as 
to how to create norms that are enforceable, 
especially when it comes to emergency situations. 
Given this intimate relationship between tempo-
rality and legal orders, it would be interesting to 
ask if and to what extent these kinds of temporality 
were the subject of reflection in any given histor-
ical context.
V. Concluding Remark
Even from the handful of notions of time dealt 
with here, it is quite obvious that law and legal 
195 See in particular the contributions by 
Rosa, above, note 91.
196 Cf. D. 39.1.5.12; for the translation, 
see Watson (1998) 376.
197 Cf. DeMayno (1598), ad D. 39.1.5.11, 
n. 1, fol. 20vb: No(ta) ex illo tex(to) 
regulam, quam quotidie allegatur, quod 
ubicumque peri(culum) est in mora, 
tunc recedimus a regulis iuris communis, 
et remittit(ur) iuris dispositio, etiam 
prohibitiva.
198 Müller (1714).
199 On this provision, see Grünthal
(1982) 53–65.
200 Kley (2013) 338–342, 383–384; 
Bellanger (2001).
201 See already above, at note 103.
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knowledge process different historical notions of 
temporality. It has been suggested in this contribu-
tion that law includes something like metahistor-
ical elements with regard to its relation to time. As 
a result, legal historical research focusing on the 
temporality of law is able to do more than enhance 
our knowledge about different cultural, social, and 
historical perceptions of time. It could also con-
tribute to the important question put forward by 
Joachim Rückert,202 namely, to what extent has 
law represented and continues to represent a phe-
nomenon of autonomy. An important step toward 
answering this question could (and should) be a 
history of law, legal knowledge, and temporality 
focusing on the Western tradition. The next step 
would involve a comparison of the notions of time 
in the history of the Western legal tradition with 
other legal cultures, for instance, in Asia or Africa. 
In this regard, the history of law and time is truly a 
subject of global legal history research.

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